Showing posts with label Military Matters. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Military Matters. Show all posts

18 August 2017

Pelting of stones by Chinese, Indian troops in Ladakh region surprises officials

Dinakar Peri, Vijaita Singh

One ITBP man sustained head injuries, according to officials who briefed The Hindu about the dramatic standoff that began around 6 a.m. on Tuesday.

While standoffs in the Ladakh region between Indian and Chinese troops are almost routine in the summer months, what surprised officials was the pelting of stones by the two sides on Independence Day.

A day after the incident, the two sides held a flag meeting at the Border Personnel Meeting (BPM) point at Chushul in eastern Ladakh.

One ITBP man sustained head injuries, according to officials who briefed The Hindu about the dramatic standoff that began around 6 a.m. on Tuesday.

The pelting of stones took place when the two sides were retreating after a face-off at Finger Four and Finger Five near Pangong Lake on August 15. The standoffs lasted half-an-hour each.

The scuffle at Finger Four took place at 6 a.m., and the one at Finger Five at 7.30 a.m. The two sides took positions and the situation was defused by 9 a.m., officials said.

A top government source said the situation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh has been deteriorating since April.

ADMIRAL SCOTT SWIFT ON LEADERSHIP, RISK, AND A LIFE IN THE U.S. NAVY

By Christopher Nelson

I recently had the chance to sit down and chat with Admiral Scott Swift, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. In forty-five minutes we covered a range of topics, from leadership styles to discussions on risk, naval culture, and why he joined the U.S. Navy.

Sir, I’d like to start with a question about leadership. How would you describe your leadership style?

It’s an interesting question. I think if you want to understand my leadership style you have to ask a lot of other people. My experience is that when leaders are asked that question, they describe what they desire their leadership style to be as opposed to what it actually may be. But in a word, I would say the leadership style I try to emulate is to be inclusive. Leaders that I admire most are those leaders that have pursued an inclusive leadership style. As opposed to the opposite – an exclusive leadership style – one that excludes other opinions, one that excludes ideas that don’t match with their view of the world. Part of that inclusive leadership is uncertainty, it’s an important element. And it’s not something that is to be diminished but recognized and accounted for. 

Anytime you are a leader in the military – or leader of any organization – there is more uncertainty than certainty in the decisions you face. And yet I struggled for a long time looking for words to describe that uncertainty in a broader context. Someone mentioned to me, actually they walked up to me and gave me a little piece of paper with a word written on it, and the word was “vulnerability.” I think as a leader it is important to be vulnerable. I don’t hear anyone saying that. Rather, I hear people saying to be a good leader it is about toughness, it’s about courage; it’s about being demonstrative and committed. I don’t see people saying it is really important as a leader to be vulnerable. Now, I don’t recommend that approach either, but in a discussion about leadership, I think it is important to tie that vulnerability into an element of inclusive leadership.

Here's how technology can help unburden DIA analysts


The Defense Intelligence Agency's iHUB brings employees, industry and academia together to leverage commercial advancements in sectors such as artificial intelligence and machine learning in support of analysts.

The Defense Intelligence Agency is the latest national security organization to adopt the free-form feel and practices of Silicon Valley companies.

Acknowledging the need to leverage commercial advancements in technology — and even business practices — DIA is trying to help unburden analysts from the deluge of data using state-of-the-art artificial intelligence and machine learning.

The notion was how to ideate — there are lots of smart people in the classified-intelligence community space, but there are so many concepts to gain from industry, Al Bolden, the director of innovation at DIA, told a small group of reporters during DIA’s Industry Day series, held August 2-3.

DIA has held two previous industry days, which are “designed to find new capabilities and business processes from the private sector and academia, and introduce them to DIA’s collaborative Innovation Hub (iHUB) environment to create, test and evaluate potential products.”

Moreover, the new iHUB, which hosts the industry days and was established September 2016 as a result of meetings in August 2016, seeks to bring DIA employees of all stripes and mission areas together both virtually and in a space emulating a Silicon Valley company. Employees can gather, write on the walls and collaborate in a more informal way.

Strategy Considerations Across the Spectrum of Warfare

By Vincent Dueñas

Today, warfare is characterized by low-intensity conflicts, nuclear deterrence, and emergent cyber conflicts, yet the United States military must engage in all three while simultaneously remaining prepared for high-intensity conflicts. For the U.S., the main character of conflict post-World War II has been in limited warfare. For example, the U.S. has not committed all its resources, such as nuclear weapons, into any specific conflict because a total war with a nuclear country would obliterate entire populations. The modern era has also seen the rise of compelling and effective non-state actors who have become influential by using social media to organize and resource their activities.

As a global superpower, the United States is forced to confront the entire spectrum of conflict. The U.S. government and the American people promote a free and democratic way of life, yet attract ever-increasing hostility as a result of extensive economic and military concerns abroad. In order to protect its interests, the U.S. government may need to engage in conflict as matter of policy. As the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted, “war is the continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.”[1] Where diplomatic, informational and economic solutions have been exhausted, when leveraged, warfare remains a legitimate option that will need to be clearly articulated to the American public.

Studying Conflict and Practicing Peacebuilding

By Richard Caplan

What can one say about the academic study of violent conflict and its implications for the practice of peacebuilding? There is no reason to assume a necessary relationship between these two spheres of activity; the study of armed conflict may or may not have any practical significance for peacebuilding. Of course many scholars in this field are motivated in part by the hope and expectation that their findings will make a contribution, however slight, to the building and maintenance of peace. The editors of Journal of Peace Research articulated this same expectation when, in the inaugural issue of the journal some 50 years ago, they expressed the view that ‘[p]eace research should … concern itself with [the] reduction of violence and [the] promotion of integration.…and should, preferably, have relevance for peace policy’ (Editorial 1964, 2,4). There are two aspects to this question: one is the relationship between the study of war and the study of peace, which other scholars have addressed (Gledhill and Bright 2017); the other is the relationship between the study of war and the practice of peacebuilding. This essay is concerned with the latter aspect and, more specifically, with how the academic study of armed conflict may be able to further enrich the practice of peacebuilding. » More

DIA director: We are preparing to fight the last war

Mark Pomerleau 

Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart testifies on Capitol Hill in Washington, Tuesday, Feb. 9, 2016, before a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on worldwide threats.

Many top defense officials acknowledge that while the nature of war has not and likely won’t change, the character of war is.

This is evident in conflict today and projected battles of the future with a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic effects against militaries and to effect populations using the information space.

Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, calls this fifth-generation war.

Does war fighting in the information age still look like two armies clashing on a battlefield – a violent clash between hostile forces each trying to impose their will on the other? In part yes, Stewart said during a keynote address at DoDIIS 2017 in St. Louis Monday. The nature of warfare hasn’t changed. War remains an act of force to compel an adversary – nothing less, but the battlefield isn’t always physical these days.

“All too often we find ourselves fighting warfare in the ways that are not purely kinetic,” he said.

As opposed to specific platforms like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Stewart said for him fifth-generation war is about the fight for information.

17 August 2017

*** Guadalcanal: The Battle That Sealed the Pacific War

By George Friedman

About 75 years ago, U.S. Marines landed on the islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi and Florida in the British Solomon Islands. Their mission was to block the Japanese from building an airfield on the island and, after blocking them, to build their own base to fly from while the Marines drove the remaining Japanese out. The U.S. Navy would land the Marines on the island, block Japanese resupply and reinforcements from landing, and secure the American line of supply from Australia and New Caledonia.

Two months earlier, the Japanese had suffered a strategic defeat at Midway, losing a substantial portion of their fleet in the process. Japan was not without resources, but its primary thinking was now the strategic defensive. It sought to secure its gains by two means: reinforcing the layers of islands it had, and conducting regional offensives in defense of its holdings.

The American fleet wasn’t ready for major operations, nor did the U.S. Air Force yet exist in force, but the U.S. strategy had become obvious. There were two lines of attack available. First, there was a western offensive, running from Australia to New Guinea to the Philippines to Taiwan and Okinawa. Second, there was an offensive from the east: Hawaii-Gilbert Islands-Carolines-Marshalls-Marianas-Bonin-Okinawa. Put in terms of the critical and famous islands, this was an offensive through Tarawa, Saipan and Iwo Jima to Okinawa – and many other brutal but less famous islands.

*** The War of the Future: A Conceptual Framework and Practical Conclusions: Essays on Strategic Thought

By Gudrun Persson 

‘Unfortunately, outside the confines of the intelligence services, there are very few people in the West capable of analysing the development of Soviet military thinking. As a result there is a great danger that Soviet policies and actions, especially in the military sphere, might be misinterpreted’. These words were written in 1991 by Christopher Donnelly, one of those few Western analysts who focused on studying Soviet military thinking during the Cold War. ‘The problem that faces most Western political analysts’, he continued, ‘is that the USSR has a very individual approach to the study and practice of war. It is not perhaps unique, but it is very different from the approaches taken in Western countries. A failure to understand … those differences will result in serious errors of analysis.’2

The subsequent years were not good to Western understanding of Russian military thinking. Other regional priorities, not least in the Middle East, meant that expertise on Russia was side-lined or wound down. On one hand, some hoped that Russia might become a partner – and not a subject of concern. On the other, the Russian armed forces clearly faced numerous serious problems and so did not pose a threat.

*** China’s Military Built with Cloned Weapons


Historically, China has been a great innovator contributing inventions such as gunpowder, paper and the compass to human advancement. However, China has earned an international reputation in recent decades as being the home of a prolific copycat culture.

The Chinese have become proficient at cloning products ranging from designer handbags and the latest smartphones to movies and alcoholic beverages. Fake Apple stores, counterfeit KFC restaurants and imitation IKEA big-box outlets dot the Chinese landscape. They have even built entire replica European towns.

Some Western observers believe this cultural attitude towards imitation is rooted in Confucianism where followers traditionally learned by replicating masterworks and then tried to improve upon them.

Chinese reinterpretation of Nike sandals, Logo

The fact that the Chinese commonly refer to today’s imitation products as “Shanzhai” indicates that they recognize the dubious nature of the current practice. The term “Shanzhai” translates to “mountain stronghold” and was originally applied to pirate factories producing counterfeit goods in remote areas beyond the reach of regulatory control.

The copycat business is no longer restricted to outlying lawless regions. It has entered the mainstream and been embraced by government officials who seem content to allow other nations to develop products and technology which they can then acquire legitimately through licensing or illegitimately through counterfeiting and espionage. This approach allows China to stay competitive on the world stage while saving them the time and money it would cost to develop their own products.

Sustainable UN Peacekeeping Offensive Operations: UXOs, ERW and IEDs

by Antonio Garcia

This essay explores the themes of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping offensive operations and Unexploded Ordinance (UXOs), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). As the character of conflict changes, there is an increased international focus on IEDs. The traditional threat of ERW has been further complicated by the preponderance of IEDs in war-affected countries. The UN is thus adapting its conventional approach in dealing with mines and UXOs to the complexities of asymmetric warfare where IEDs have increasingly become the weapon of choice for non-state actors. Earlier this year, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) celebrated its 20th year anniversary as the lead UN agency addressing the scourge of mines, and UXOs. The Security Council and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has also taken novel approaches in combating spoilers with the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) as the first strategically mandated offensive peacekeeping force. This essay discusses the interrelation between UN peacekeeping offensive action and the creation of UXOs and its potential effect on local populations and existing humanitarian crises and adds tactical and strategic analysis.

The evolution of modern United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has resulted in a variety of complex operational situations with differing intensities of conflict. The use of force or the threat thereof to counter rebel groups and spoilers remains a fundamental part of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and prevention. The UN has adapted to changes in the operational environment with a number of innovations of which the deployment of the first offensively mandated force, the FIB, indicated a firm strategic resolve from the Security Council. The robust stance of the UN peacekeeping missions in Mali and the Central African Republic are also indicative of such approaches as well as the support role, which the UN has taken in the African Union mission in Somalia. This piece links the effect of tactical offensive operations to the further creation of ERW which may increasingly contribute to humanitarian crises.

A battle and a betrayal

Ajay Saini

The story of Convict No. 276 and the Battle of Aberdeen. Fought between the Andamanese and the British, it finally pushed the tribe to extinction.

In April 1858, Aga, a convict gangsman at the Ross Island penal settlement in the Andaman Islands shared an escape plan with his fellow prisoners incarcerated on the isolated island by the British after the 1857 rebellion.

The gangsman, with his limited geographical knowledge, reasoned that once they reached the shore opposite Ross Island, it would at most be a ten-day march to Rangoon, the capital of Burma, where the convicts could seek refuge.

The plan seemed infallible and the prisoners quickly accepted it.

The great escape

On April 23, 90 convicts boarded rafts made from felled trees bound with tent ropes and escaped Ross Island. After a two-day journey, 40 convicts from the stations at Chatham Island and Phoenix Bay also joined them. A contingent of 130 convicts marched into the unfamiliar jungles under Aga’s command.

Everything seemed in order until Aga’s limited geographical knowledge was soon exposed. The convicts walked through thick jungles for 13 days with no sense of direction. Sometimes, Aga led them back to the same place they had passed days before.

When Words Risk Provoking War

BY KORI SCHAKE

Words especially matter between societies that poorly understand each other’s motivations and intentions, as do North Korea and the U.S.

In 1949, the United States withdrew its military forces from the Korean Peninsula. Secretary of State Dean Acheson then gave an important speech defining American national-security interests—which notably excluded Korea. Today, few people recall the military retrenchment by the Truman administration, which sent a powerful signal that America was narrowing its scope of action. It’s not the drawing down of U.S. forces but rather Acheson’s speech that is commonly cited as the signal of American abandonment of South Korea. Words matter: Acheson didn’t cause the Korean war, but his words are remembered as the provocation.

Words especially matter between societies that poorly understand each other’s motivations and intentions, as do North Korea and the U.S. We can afford to be sloppy in our formulations among friends, where cultural similarity or exposure give context, but neither of those circumstances pertain with North Korea. So whether or not President Trump intended an ultimatum with his statement on Tuesday that North Korea “best not make any more threats to the United States” lest it face “fire and fury like the world has never seen,” it may have serious consequences. North Korea afterward threatened to fire missiles toward Guam. The next move falls to the U.S.

16 August 2017

Not Every Civil War Is a Guerilla War

Patrick Burke

Civil wars have been given fairly blunt analysis for years. Security analysts have painted all civil wars as “guerrilla wars.” It’s also common for civil wars to be depicted as featuring near-constant fighting until one side either gives up or is defeated. Very few analysts account for the fluctuating relationships between governments and insurgents.

But guerrilla warfare refers to a specific type of fighting that is not always a feature of civil wars. And the relationship between insurgents and governments is often quite complicated.

Guerilla wars are characterized by a weak combatant fighting a powerful foe through deception. Guerrillas use roadside bombs, sniper attacks, occasional ambushes and sabotage of supply lines to wear down the stronger side’s willingness to continue fighting.

Heavy weaponry such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery or aircraft are all absent from the guerrilla’s arsenal.

Guerrillas don’t have the military capability to take over territory from the stronger side, and rarely try to do so. They may be able to control some peripheral rural areas, but guerrilla warfare doesn’t usually feature front lines. Instead, guerrillas hide among civilians in areas under the “control” of the stronger side.

Sustainable UN Peacekeeping Offensive Operations: UXOs, ERW and IEDs

By Antonio Garcia 

This essay explores the themes of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping offensive operations and Unexploded Ordinance (UXOs), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). As the character of conflict changes, there is an increased international focus on IEDs. The traditional threat of ERW has been further complicated by the preponderance of IEDs in war-affected countries. The UN is thus adapting its conventional approach in dealing with mines and UXOs to the complexities of asymmetric warfare where IEDs have increasingly become the weapon of choice for non-state actors. Earlier this year, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) celebrated its 20th year anniversary as the lead UN agency addressing the scourge of mines, and UXOs. The Security Council and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has also taken novel approaches in combating spoilers with the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) as the first strategically mandated offensive peacekeeping force. This essay discusses the interrelation between UN peacekeeping offensive action and the creation of UXOs and its potential effect on local populations and existing humanitarian crises and adds tactical and strategic analysis.

The evolution of modern United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has resulted in a variety of complex operational situations with differing intensities of conflict. The use of force or the threat thereof to counter rebel groups and spoilers remains a fundamental part of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and prevention. The UN has adapted to changes in the operational environment with a number of innovations of which the deployment of the first offensively mandated force, the FIB, indicated a firm strategic resolve from the Security Council. The robust stance of the UN peacekeeping missions in Mali and the Central African Republic are also indicative of such approaches as well as the support role, which the UN has taken in the African Union mission in Somalia. This piece links the effect of tactical offensive operations to the further creation of ERW which may increasingly contribute to humanitarian crises.

Professional Military Education Proven in Combat during the Mexican War

Capt. Patrick Naughton, U.S. Army Reserve


Battle of Cerro Gordo (1847), hand-colored lithograph, E. B. and E. C. Kellogg, New York and Hartford. The engagement was a key battle in a campaign that aimed at capturing Mexico City, the capital of Mexico. Many junior officers of the U.S. force participating in the battle would later gain prominence as senior commanders in the U.S. Civil War; among these, Capt. Robert E. Lee. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Professional military education (PME) is a critically important part of building effective military leaders. This fact is sometimes overlooked due to the misguided belief that experience and field service alone will make the best leader. While these items are significant, when combined with PME, they make a more potent recipe for a truly well-rounded military leader. Ultimately, the decisive test of the success of PME is its relevance and application in combat situations.

The Mexican War (1846–1848) occurred in an often-neglected period in America’s history. It is mainly remembered and studied by historians for the insight it gives into the early military careers of many famous American Civil War officers on both sides of the conflict. What is not as readily realized is that it served as the validation and true starting point for the further development and implementation of PME for America’s armed forces.
History of Early American Professional Military Education

No program of formal military education was established by America upon its independence from Great Britain. Officers were generally selected from the higher echelons of society, and they received their commissions through family connections or purchase.1

A Professional Military Education for Congress

By Jules Hurst & Sam Stowers

The U.S. military loves formal education. Commissioned officers attend professional military education at every stage of their careers from pre-commissioning to executive-level ranks. Initially, training focuses on teaching the basic skills required of all airmen, sailors, soldiers, and marines, job specific-training, and small-unit leadership. Then, at roughly the ten-year mark, officers partake in intermediate-level and senior-level coursework that emphasizes a congressionally mandated curriculum in national military strategy, joint planning, joint doctrine, joint command and control, force requirements development and operational contracting. This standardized coursework aims to produce “strategically minded joint leaders who possess an intuitive approach to joint warfighting built on individual service competencies,” and it relies on an officer’s previous ten plus years of military experience to provide the context that makes it effective.

The U.S. government fails to provide the same quality of professional education to a more influential group—the 535 Senators, Representatives, and their staff who craft the nation’s $600 billion-dollar defense budget, exercise oversight of U.S. armed forces, and though they rarely exercise it, hold power to declare war.

US ready to help India modernise its military, says top American navy commander


A top American commander has offered the US help to India to modernise its military, saying that together they can improve India’s military capabilities in significant and meaningful ways.

Over the past decade, the defence trade between the US and India has touched nearly $15 billion and is expected to gallop in the next few years, as India is looking at the US for some of the latest military hardware including fighter jets, latest unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft carriers.

“I believe that the US is ready to help India modernise its military. India has been designated a major defence partner of the US. This is a strategic declaration that’s unique to India and the US. It places India on the same level that we have many of our treaty allies,” commander of the US Pacific Command or PACOM Admiral Harry Harris told PTI.

“This is important, and I believe that together we will be able to improve India’s military capabilities in significant and meaningful ways,” said Harris, who has been personally pushing for a strong India-US defence relationship.

The admiral said he is fairly happy with the level of defence cooperation that exists today between the two sides.

“We have been partners with India in the Malabar exercise series, the maritime exercise, for a number of years. I participated in one of the very first... one of the early Malabars, in 1995,” he recollected, reflecting on the decades old association with India.

15 August 2017

Weekly Recon - Future of Infantry, 'Rapid Eagle', Space War CONOPS, ...

By Blake Baiers

Good Saturday morning and welcome to Weekly Recon. On this day in 1961, in an effort to stem the tide of refugees attempting to leave East Berlin, the communist government of East Germany begins building the Berlin Wall to divide East and West Berlin. Construction of the wall caused a short-term crisis in U.S.-Soviet bloc relations, and the wall itself came to symbolize the Cold War. In the days and weeks to come, construction of a concrete block wall began, complete with sentry towers and minefields around it. The Berlin Wall succeeded in completely sealing off the two sections of Berlin. 

On the Ground

The U.S. military is exploring the future of infantry operations, and it recently tasked Lockheed Martin with the job of developing concepts of future technologies for infantry squads. Under a program dubbed Squad X Core Technologies, Lockheed was awarded $12.8 million to design and test prototype equipment for dismounted infantry units. The undertaking could prove difficult however, as the Army has long aimed at fielding new high-tech equipment for its grunts through sweeping technological advancement programs, but often come up short. As Stephen Carlson at UPI notes, “High costs and the difficulties of using sophisticated equipment while moving on foot in complicated environments has delayed deployment.” Beyond Squad X, the U.S. Army is also looking to replace its M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) under a program called the Next Generation Squad Automatic Rifle (NGSAR). But, the Army wants to explore the possibility of the NGSAR filling a number of different roles, including: carbine, medium machine gun, and designated marksman rifle. But as Joseph Trevithick points out at The War Zone, the Army has a long track record of failing in such endeavors, from the M-60’s development to the failed XM-8 family of rifles. The Army has yet to decide just how wide of a scope the NGSAR will have.

Army officials outline challenges to cyber, signal and electronic warfare training.


Lt. Gen. Mark Bowman, USA (Ret.), former director of command, control, communications and computers/cyber for the Joint Staff, paints a dire picture of future warfare. The next war, he says, will begin with wave after wave of cyber and electronic warfare attacks that our nation is not prepared for. Although the Army is making strides in training the cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA) force, the service may not be able to address all scenarios in a training environment.

“We as a nation are extremely vulnerable. More so than any of us would really want to admit—not only our networks but our infrastructure and the bad guys are banging on us every day,” Gen. Bowman told the AFCEA TechNet Augusta audience. He added that although the service is training for CEMA at the National Training Center, it is not yet doing enough.

He related a time when he was in charge of a network that was attacked and taken down by the Russians. “It was an ugly event, but it was much the same as a natural disaster, such as Katrina. They whacked us. Our network went down, and we started rebuilding,” Gen. Bowman recalled.

But if hit with multiple waves of attacks, rebuilding will not be so simple.

“They’re going to hit us and hit us and hit us, and the only way we’ll be able to survive and to operate through that is to start expanding the level of training and the experience that we have operating with degraded systems or sometimes no systems at all,” he added.

Blog: Army Confronts the Changing Face of War

By George I. Seffers

Cyber, robots, artificial intelligence and other technologies will define the multidomain battlefield.

On the multi-domain battlefield of the future, U.S. forces can expect to see more robots, pilotless ships and planes, and driverless convoys, as well as cyber and other game-changing capabilities, said Lt. Gen. Paul Nakasone, USA, commanding general, U.S. Army Cyber Command.

Gen. Nakasone made the comments during the afternoon keynote address at AFCEA TechNet Augusta 2017 in Augusta, Georgia.

“We are witnessing a fundamental change and transformation in the character of war," he said. “This transformation is being driven by technology and demographics, socioeconomic and political changes.”

The general compared the changes to those made during World War I, which transformed warfare for the 20th century, just as cyber and other technologies are doing for the 21st century. “To succeed on the future battlefield will require our Army and the joint force to adapt how we fight in response to these changes. Military history is filled with examples of armies that adapted their tactics in response to change, and quite frankly, those armies that did not,” Gen. Nakasone said.