Showing posts with label Military Matters. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Military Matters. Show all posts

25 June 2017

*** This Is How Great-Power Wars Get Started

In the last month, for the first time since the civil war in Syria began in 2011, the United States has directly attacked Syrian government forces or proxies — not just once, but at least four times. The urgent question now is less about Syria than Russia, which in response to the latest of these incidents, in which a U.S. fighter plane shot down a Syrian jet, threatened to target any U.S.-led coalition aircraft flying over Syria.

Are the U.S. and Russia being sucked into war in the Middle East, and if so, how can escalation be averted?

The present political dynamics in the Middle East are unsettled and kaleidoscopic. But in the interests of brevity, leaving aside smaller players, and before we think about the role of the United States and Russia, the basic configurations of power in the region since the 2011 Arab Spring can be simplified in terms of five loose groupings.

First, a grouping of Sunni monarchies (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Bahrain); Arab secular nationalists (Egypt since President Abdel Fatteh el-Sisi took over in 2013, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia); and Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s faction in eastern Libya.

** Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2016

By Kendra Dupuy, Scott Gates

As its title suggests, this brief highlights the number of conflicts and battlefield deaths that have occurred in the world since 1946. The text´s authors note, for example, that 1) the number of armed struggles in the world declined slightly from 52 in 2015 to 49 in 2016; 2) 14 percent fewer people died in 2016 as a direct result of violent conflicts than in 2015, and 22% fewer than in 2014; and 3) the internationalization of organized violence continues apace, which consequently makes such clashes longer lasting and more difficult to solve.

2016 was the fifth most violent year in the world since the end of the Cold War. While violence levels were lower than in 2014 and 2015, ongoing conflicts with serious regional impacts are challenging the international community’s ability to ensure global peace.

Brief Points 

There was a decline in battle casualties in 2016. 14% fewer people died in 2016 as a direct result of conflict than in 2015, and 22% fewer than in 2014. 
The number of armed conflicts in the world declined slightly from 52 in 2015 to 49 in 2016. 
The internationalized conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan have the highest number of casualty levels globally. 
The trend in the increasing internationalization of conflicts is concerning, as these conflicts, on average, last longer, are more violent, and are more difficult to solve. 

Space Corps, What Is It Good For? Not Much: Air Force Leaders


CAPITOL HILL: The nation does not need a new armed service specializing in space, the leaders of the Air Force said today in rejecting a House Armed Services Committee plan. In fact, they said, carving a “Space Corps” out of the Air Force — which handles most space missions today — would only make it harder to integrate space operations with warfare in the air, cyberspace, land, and sea.

“The Pentagon is complicated enough,” Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson told reporters. “This will make it more complex, add more boxes to the organization chart, and cost more money. And if I had more money, I would put it into lethality, not bureaucracy….I don’t need another chief of staff and another six deputy chiefs of staff.”

The brainchild of Strategic Forces Subcommittee chairman Mike Rogers, the HASC proposal would create the Space Corps as its own service with its own Chief of Staff sitting on the Joint Chiefs. The new Space Corps would be a separate uniformed service from the Air Force but would report to the civilian Air Force Secretary, who would oversee both Air Force and Space Corps acquisition. That’s similar to the longstanding arrangement whereby the Marine Corps is a separate service from the Navy but reports to the Navy Secretary. The Navy-Marine model proves such arrangements can work — but then the sea services have had since 1798 to work out the many bugs.

Canada's Military Gets More Cyber, and the Headaches That Come With It

Alex Grigsby

Earlier this month, Canada released a white paper that set outs the country's defense policy for the next twenty years. The headlines have focused on the massive spending increase, mostly to placate President Trump, who has criticized NATO countries for not pulling their own weight. The government intends on increasing the Canadian Forces' budget by 70 percent--mostly to buy big ticket items like eighty-eight fighter aircraft to replace its aging CF-18 (a variant of the U.S. F/A-18 Hornet) and six arctic patrol ships, and to grow the regular force by 3,500 to a total of 71,500, and to add 1,500 to the reserves. 

Beyond the new toys and quintessentially Canadian hand wringing about the role the military should play in peacekeeping missions, the white paper signals a shift in Canada's approach to cyberspace. For the first time, the government has acknowledged that the Canadian Forces will build an offensive cyber capability deployable in support of government-authorized military missions.

Canada has had the ability to engage in offensive cyber operations for a while now, depending on how you define them. The country's signals intelligence agency, Communications Security Establishment (CSE), breaks into foreign networks to extract foreign intelligence all the time, much like its other Five Eyes partners. It also supports the Canadian Forces with intelligence support when on deployment, as it did when Canadian troops were deployed to Afghanistan and in contributions to combating the self-declared Islamic State.

Boeing signs $100 million contract to keep navy’s P-8I aircraft flying

By Ajai Shukla

The Indian Navy’s Boeing P-8I long-range maritime patrol aircraft, reputedly the world’s most fearsome submarine hunters, have proved themselves in joint patrols with the US Navy in the Indian Ocean, tracking Chinese submarines.

Last July, a pleased Indian Navy signed a billion-dollar contract with Boeing for four more P-8Is to augment the eight aircraft it already flies. Delivery will begin in 2020.

But, with Chinese submarine activity growing in the Indian Ocean, the navy wants more P-8Is on station today. Last Monday, the navy signed a $100 million contract; requiring Boeing to maintain spare parts and personnel in India, ready to respond to any defects or failures in the P-8I fleet over the next three years.

The so-called “performance based logistics” contract requires Boeing to continue the warranty services it has so far provided under an initial production contract, which will expire in October.

“This contract will substantially bolster Boeing’s performance-based support to the Indian Navy and should maintain or increase the operational capability of the eight-aircraft fleet,” said Boeing on Monday.

24 June 2017

** Professional Military Education: What Is It Good For?

By Pauline Shanks Kaurin

Professional Military Education (PME) covers a wide range of activities. In one sense it refers to a plethora of training, continuing education, and other activities designed to provide development to members of the military at various points in their career and to prepare them for the next level of responsibilities. The U.S. military requires professional education for both officers and enlisted personnel and its form, content, and objective varies across rank, service, and military role. But what is its overarching purpose? Why do we invest so much in this effort? In his 2012 White Paper on Joint Education, General Martin Dempsey argues the purpose of PME is “…to develop leaders by conveying a broad body of professional knowledge and developing the habits of mind central to the profession.”[1] In addition to critical thinking, he lists the ability to understand the security environment, respond to uncertainty, anticipate and lead transitions through change, and operate with trust, understanding, and empathy as important skills for future military leaders.[2]

Taking this document as a starting point, I focus here on the Staff and War College experiences in U.S. professional military education. While many of the questions raised here apply equally—if perhaps differently—to the education of others in the military and other militaries, a narrow scope allows for more precise framing of questions about the purpose of PME. While it seems we would be able to discern the purpose and aims of military education by looking at various official military and institutional documents, they only tell part of the story. What we find upon closer scrutiny are multiple stories about what exactly professional military education is supposed to do and how it is to be done. Some think of it as the equivalent of graduate school needing research and rigor, others think of it as training that ought to be conducted by expert practitioners, and still others a higher level initiation into the Profession of Arms. Accordingly, a closer look at PME is necessary to clarify these basic questions, which then can lead us to thinking through what the focus and content of these experiences ought to be.

The Future of Military IT: Gait Biometrics, Software Nets, and Photon Communicators**


DISA director Lt. Gen. Alan Lynn talks about the tech he’s eyeing, some of which is barely out of the theoretical realm.

Tomorrow’s soldiers will wield encrypted devices that unlock to their voices, or even their particular way of walking, and communicate via ad-hoc, software-defined networks that use not radio waves but light according to Lt. Gen. Alan Lynn, who leads the Defense Information Systems Agency, the U.S. military’s IT provider. On Tuesday, Lynn talked about next-generation technologies that DISA is looking into, some of which are barely experimental today.

Here are few of the key areas:

Biometric access

Forget thumbprint unlock screens for phones and communications equipment. Tomorrow’s next-generation biometric identifiers are related to the data that soldiers create through their activity. That could include everything from the way that a soldier walks, to the way she holds her phone, to places that she’s been.

The Whiskey-Fueled Riot That Forged West Point

Matthew Gault

The United States Military Academy at West Point is synonymous with prestige. Its list of graduates includes two U.S. presidents, 40 astronauts and countless Rhodes Scholars and Medal of Honor recipients. For the past 150 years, West Point’s name has meant excellence, discipline and courage.

The name once meant debauchery, laziness and alcohol poisoning. For the first half of the 19th century, West Point was more Animal House than, well, West Point. That all changed when a new superintendent took control of the academy, modernized its practices and disciplined its cadets.

In return, the cadets got shit-can drunk on Christmas Eve and rioted.

The ensuing chaos destroyed one whole barracks. Dozens of inebriated students ran through the campus, threatening officers and puking all over the grounds. In the morning, the new superintendent rounded up a third of the worst cadets and expelled them.

It was a moment that defined the academy, the last outburst of public excess before West Point settled down and became the prestigious institution it is today. The Eggnog Riot was West Point’s last great bender.

The White House, Wonder Woman and What to Know About Thucydides

Olivia B. Waxman

For a man who's been dead for more than 2,000 years, the Ancient Athenian historian Thucydides is proving surprising relevant. He makes an appearance — though not one entirely based on facts — in the blockbuster Wonder Woman, and on Wednesday Politico reported that Graham Allison, the political scientist who wrote Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?, recently briefed President Donald Trump's National Security Council on what the Peloponnesian War, fought between Athens and Sparta in the 5th century BC, could teach them about U.S.-China relations. 

But, though Thucydides may be having a moment, theorists of international relations have always looked to his writings for guidance on approaching international conflicts. 

He didn't always have all of the answers, however, and in fact, learned them the hard way. Thucydides was well-connected in Athenian society (he snagged an elite position as one of the ten stratēgoi, or military commanders, who were picked each year) but didn't prove himself a particularly adept military leader. During the war, the Spartan general Brasidas caught him and his fleet off-guard and was able to snatch up the strategically-important city of Amphipolis from under his nose. Thucydides was banished as a punishment so, during his 20 years in exile, which lasted until Sparta finally conquered Athens in 404 B.C., he had a lot of time to think about the meaning of war and write about the history he was living through. 

23 June 2017

Facing limits of remote hacking, Army cybers up the battlefield


The US military and intelligence communities have spent much of the last two decades fighting wars in which the US significantly over-matched its opponents technologically—on the battlefield and off. In addition to its massive pure military advantage, the US also had more sophisticated electronic warfare and cyber capabilities than its adversaries. But those advantages haven't always translated into dominance over the enemy. And the US military is facing a future in which American forces in the field will face adversaries that can go toe to toe with the US in the electromagnetic domain—with disastrous physical results.

That's in part why the Army Cyber Command recently experimented with putting "cyber soldiers" in the field as part of an exercise at the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. In addition to fielding troops to provide defensive and offensive cyber capabilities for units coming into NTC for training, the Army has also been arming its opposition force (the trainers) with cyber capabilities to demonstrate their impact.

Why Russian Hybrid Warfare is a Threat to … Russia

By Dan Cox and Bruce Stanley

There has been much consternation in America and Europe for the past decade since Russia began practicing hybrid warfare. Ostensibly initiated by Russian General Valery Gerasimov with PM Putin’s support, hybrid warfare has resulted in Russian taking Crimea without a shot being fired, occupying Donetsk in eastern Ukraine, keeping Syrian President Assad in power, and potentially influencing the outcome of an American election. The aggressive and successfully moves in Ukraine have so alarmed some European nations that they are considering withdrawing from the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty which attempts to outlaw the production and use of landmines. Both Ukraine and Finland have threatened to pull out of the Ottawa Landmine Ban treatybecause of perceived Russian aggression. Russia, helped spur on such a perception with a very public military exercise that contained a practice invasion of Norway and other northern European states. With so much success and so much cowering in western states, it is no wonder that much of the scholarship on Russian hybrid warfare has asserted the near infallibility of the Russian approach. While most western nations see Russian hybrid warfare as threat to the western democratic way of life, it is, ironically, more threatening to the continued existence of Russia as viable nation-state.

There is no doubt that Russia needed Crimea as its only warm water port for naval operations. The maneuvering short of war, including the introduction of Russian armed forces who did not wear an identifiable Russian uniform, can be categorized as nothing

owards a Dual Fleet? The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation and the Modernisation of Russian Naval Capabilities

By Richard Connolly

In this article, Richard Connolly examines Russia’s most recent maritime doctrine and whether the country has the material capabilities it needs to meet its naval objectives. More specifically, Connolly 1) compares the current maritime doctrine with its predecessor; 2) gauges the progress that has been made in an admittedly ambitious naval modernization program; 3) assesses how the program has been affected by financial and industrial constraints; and 4) wonders whether the naval structure that’s being created will actually serve Russia’s maritime ambitions.

This review examines Russia’s Maritime Doctrine and whether Russia possesses the material capabilities to meet the objectives contained within it. Russian thinking on the subject of naval policy attracted increased attention after the deployment of the aircraft-carrying cruiser, the Admiral Kuznetsov, to the eastern Mediterranean in autumn 2016 as part of a larger flotilla comprising cruise missile-capable ships and submarines. This surprised some observers, and served as a vivid demonstration of an increasingly assertive Russian foreign and security policy. However, the deployment of naval force to the Mediterranean would not have surprised those familiar with the updated maritime doctrine (Morskaya doktrina) that was published in July 2015. This doctrine signaled the intentions of the Russian leadership to maintain a permanent naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean in support of wider Russian foreign and security objectives. It also sets out a series of other objectives, including the construction of a modern navy equipped with qualitatively new weapon systems. Taken as a whole, the doctrine sheds light on the role that the Russian leadership envisages for the navy in supporting Russia’s pursuit of its wider security, economic and foreign policy objectives.

India kick-starts military satellite programs

By Vivek Raghuvanshi

NEW DELHI — To meet military space requirements, India plans to launch a 550-kilogram homemade military satellite within the next fortnight to join the heaviest homemade rocket, the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle Mark III, according a Ministry of Defence source.

The GSLV Mk III rocket, fired earlier this month into space, has the capacity to carry the 4-ton class of satellites, prompting some analysts here to say this is a prerequisite for an anti-satellite weapon.

"The capability to launch heavy rockets with heavier payloads is a prerequisite to put up anti-satellite weapons in the space," said a scientist with the Indian Space Research Organisation, which developed the rocket.

India officially maintains that space is for peaceful use and, as such, does not have an anti-satellite, or ASAT, program. However, sources within the state-run Defence Research and Development Organization say such a program does exist.

Speed Up Light Tank, Heavy Armor Modernization, HASC Tells Army


WASHINGTON: Congress wants the Army to get its tanks in gear. Today, the House Armed Services Committee released its draft of the 2018 defense policy bill, which all but begged the Army to accelerate its air-deployable Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle. MPF would fill a void in light tanks that’s existed since the M551 Sheridan was retired in 1996. A separate provision would order the Army to report on its plans for modernizing its heavy armored forces across the board, including “the development of a next generation infantry fighting vehicle and main battle tank” to replace the M2 Bradley and M1 Abrams respectively.

By contrast, the Army’s current focus is low-cost, short-term upgrades of existing weapons. Incrementalism has been the Army’s strategy for at least four years, since it had to cancel the Ground Combat Vehicle program and replace it with a Next Generation Combat Vehicle initiative that may or may not deliver a new design in 2035. That’s too slow for HASC, which wants the Army report to include “an accelerated long-term strategy for acquiring next generation combat vehicle capabilities” (emphasis ours).

22 June 2017

*** Understanding Tomorrow Begins Today: The Operational Environment Through 2035

Ian M. Sullivan, John C. Bauer

The Operational Environment (OE) is a combination of conditions and variables that impact a commander’s decision-making process and his/her ability to employ capabilities. The factors that define a given OE stretch across the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) spheres and form the broad setting in which the Army and any of its units, along with its joint and combined partners, conduct operations. Our ability to conceptualize and understand the OE and its lattice-work of variables – the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical terrain, and time factors (PMESII-TT) – allows us to not only conceptualize, plan, and train for the types of missions we will face in the near-term, but also to explore the types of capabilities and processes we will need to develop and/or adopt to contend with the threats we will face in the future. Our analysis of the OE indicates that key potential adversaries are focusing on developing capabilities and employing hybrid strategies that will provide direct challenges to Army and Joint and Combined forces.

The OEs of today and the future will be marked by instability. This instability will manifest itself in evolving geopolitics, resurgent nationalism, changing demographics, and unease with the results of globalization creating tension, competition for resources, and challenges to structures, order, and institutions. Instability also will result from the rapid development of technology and the resulting increase in the speed of human interaction, as well an increasing churn in economic and social spheres. A global populace that is increasingly attuned and sensitive to disparities in economic resources and the diffusion of social influence will lead to further challenges to the status quo and lead to system rattling events like the Arab Spring, the Color Revolutions in Eastern Europe, the Greek monetary crisis, and BREXIT. Also, the world order will evolve with rising nations to challenging the post-Cold War dominance of the US-led Western system. New territorial conflicts will arise in places like the South China Sea, compelling us to seek new partnerships and alliances, while climate change and geopolitical competition will open up whole new theaters of operation, such as in the Arctic. 

Darjeeling Unrest Has National Ramifications, Mamata Banerjee Shouldn’t Be Allowed To Mishandle It

Jaideep Mazumdar

Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee resists deployment of central paramilitary forces during elections in Bengal. Over the past six years that she has been in power in the state, Banerjee has never sought central forces to tackle internal disturbances in the plains of Bengal, relying solely on her police force to act (or not act, depending on the community involved) in all such incidents.

But when it comes to the Darjeeling hills, it is a different ball game altogether. Ever since trouble broke out in the hills, Banerjee has been insisting on getting central forces to be deployed. She even got the Army, which she had once ludicrously accused of trying to stage a coup, and shamelessly charged Army soldiers (deployed in a drill) of extorting money from truckers at a traffic check-post, to hit the streets of the hill town since trouble broke out on 8 June.

The reason why Banerjee wants the Army and central forces deployed in Darjeeling is that she wants to fire the gun on Gorkhas from their shoulders, with the state police remaining safely behind the battle-lines. Banerjee has a sinister motive in doing so. She wants to suppress the Gorkhaland movement by brute force, but she wants her police (and, thus, herself) to remain free of any blame for bloodshed. She knows that there will be casualties if the movement is to be suppressed by force, but she wants the central forces and the Army to be blamed for those casualties.

Here, Mamata is looking at her immediate political gains and she cares little for anything beyond that. In order to safeguard her political interests, she is even willing to put national interests to grave risk and danger. The Gorkhas are a very proud and emotional race, and the death of three Gorkhas in police firing on agitators in Darjeeling on Saturday has agitated them, hurt them and caused the community no little trauma.

U.S. May Be Defenseless Against New Hypersonic Missiles

By Larry Bell

On June 3, Russia tested a hypersonic missile system a year ahead of a preannounced schedule I previously reported that it says will make all U.S. defense systems obsolete.

Named “Zircon,” Russia’s international news site Sputnik suggests that the 4,600 mile per hour (six times the speed of sound) missile with its 250 mile range will require only three minutes and 15 seconds between launch and targeted impact.

The five-ton Zircon can reportedly be installed on Russia’s nuclear-powered strike ship Pyotr Veliky. Military analyst Vladimir Tuckkov expects that the system will be added to the country’s arsenal between 2018 and 2020. Russian authorities report that its radar target-seeker and an optical-electronic complex can trace and detect targets at hypersonic speed with capabilities to destroy the most advanced warships and aircraft carriers in a single strike.

Tim Ripley who covers defense issues for the Jane’s Defense Weekly has confirmed that Zircon could render all Western anti-aircraft defenses “obsolete.” While warning that Russia appears to be far ahead of U.S. in development, he also observes “But that doesn’t mean there isn’t some black, super-secret project run by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or DARPA.”

Whether or not the U.S. presently actually has an effective defense countermeasure program in the works is publicly uncertain. If so, it is curious why, as reported by Bill Gertz in The Washington Times last February, the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) had then just released a request seeking information to identify defensive weapon concepts to support an “analysis of alternatives” this year.

The MDA information request followed results of a study conducted by a panel of Air Force experts last fall which concluded that U.S. hypersonic weapon progress has fallen behind Russia and China. Their report criticized the Pentagon for having “no formal strategic operational concept or organizational sense of urgency.” and faulted their “lack of leadership” in developing countermeasures and defense solutions.

21 June 2017

The Special Operations Forces Christmas List

By Stu Bradin

Although the summer heat may not feel like the season for giving, I assure you that it is. This time each year the U.S. Congress starts building the budget for the next fiscal year. During this time the Military Services send to Congress their “list of additional requirements”. It is much like a child sending his/her “Christmas list” to Santa—hoping he brings the toys he/she wants. At times, the Department of Defense has told the Services to not send their requests to Congress, directing them instead to just say they support the President’s Budget. Even at these times, Congress ends up receiving the detailed lists from the Services – the “unofficial” requests always seem to make their way to the Hill. For the fiscal year 2019 budget build it does not appear that the Department of Defense has attempted to restrict the Services. This is a good thing.

To be frank, the Services should be encouraged to ALWAYS render the actual requirement to Congress. The reality is that there is a finite amount of resources, and, based on Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution, the decisions about what to fund in the U.S. military falls to the U.S. Congress. No administration should ever consider it disloyal for a Service Chief or senior leader to state what they believe to be the true requirement. And yes, requirements do change based on evolving threats, and we have to evolve with those threats if we want to defend the nation and protect our global interests. We should want our senior leaders to provide candid and professional assessments, regardless of the political climate.

Too Big to Sink

During the 2008 financial crisis the theory emerged that certain companies, particularly financial institutions, were “too big to fail.” These firms were considered to be so large and entwined with other companies that their closure would be catastrophic to the entire economy. In today’s Navy, the aircraft carrier has become “too big to sink.” When it functions as designed, it is an extremely powerful platform that has remarkable economies of scale. But carriers are crucial to so many of the fleet’s missions that if the enemy can defeat them, the results would be catastrophic for both the Navy and the nation. The loss of a $12 billion capital ship, more than 5,000 American lives, and a powerful symbol of U.S. military superiority would send shock waves around the world.

Yet the Navy remains blind to the reality that its carriers—by way of destruction, damage, or deterrence from completing their missions—are poised for defeat in battle. By accepting the eventual demise of the carrier, the Navy could accelerate its shift away from a carrier-centric fleet.

Warning Signs

Warning signs abound that the carrier may not actually be too big to sink. Loss of a carrier could be the U.S. Navy’s Black Swan—an event that seems unlikely but occurs with massive consequences that appear obvious in hindsight. 1 Nassim Nicholas Taleb says these events are characterized by “rarity, extreme impact, and retrospective (though not prospective) predictability.” 2 Today’s carrier-centric operations could easily fit this mold.

From 9/11 to London: The Need for Virtual Battle Space Maneuver Doctrine

by Stefan J. Banach

The ability to generate global influence by maneuvering one civilian population against another, along Virtual Battle Space Avenues of Approach, to produce catastrophic physical effects is a significant transformational change for warfare. This phenomenon first occurred in the 21st Century on 9/11, when 19 foreign civilian terrorist fighters from the Middle East, attacked the United States. The buildup to the strike on 9/11 was conducted largely in virtual space to set the conditions for the terrorists’ success in physical space. This new form of global Virtual Battle Space Maneuver (VBSM), created significant detrimental physical space effects and was demonstrated a second time during the Arab Spring in 2011 and with similar success as exhibited by ISIL. The myriad terrorist attacks since 9/11 to the June 2017 murderous acts in London, underscore the point that this virtual scheme of maneuver is no longer an anomaly; rather it is the norm in the world today.

What we see as apparent problems, are often merely symptoms of deeper issues. These problems possess their own dynamics and relationships in both virtual and physical space. The sources of novelty and complexity that the U.S. military experiences everyday are derivatives of technological revolutions and ideological influences that have driven adaptation for millennia. The U.S. military is now confronted with a mounting number of strategic and operational negative externalities, given the growing cognitive dissonance relative to VBSM and Physical Battle Space Maneuver (PBSM), in an unprecedented 21st Century global conflict space. The velocity and viral nature of these evolving dynamic factors often overwhelm existing industrial-age cognitive processes and leadership approaches, which are proving to be inappropriate for contemporary complex problem-solving.