3 April 2025

India-Bangladesh-Pakistan: South Asia’s Fateful Triangle

Swasti Sachdeva
Source Link

54 years after Operation Searchlight and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s historic declaration of the independence of Bangladesh, the country stands at a critical juncture yet again. As in 1971, decisions in Dhaka could alter regional dynamics, especially vis-à-vis India and Pakistan, with whom Bangladesh’s destiny has been closely intertwined.

There is growing bonhomie between Bangladesh’s Muhammad Yunus-led interim government and Pakistan — a development that has not gone unnoticed in New Delhi, whose relationship with Dhaka faces uncertainties. A much anticipated meeting between Yunus and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the upcoming BIMSTEC Summit in Thailand is unlikely to happen. Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan as well as China are deepening.

Evolving Foreign Policy: Liberation to the July Uprising

While Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan have warmed since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government on August 5 last year, ties between the two countries were by and large fraught for decades. Dhaka’s foreign policy stemmed from a troubled and contested history, a lack of ideological consensus, and a sharply divided polity, among other geoeconomic and regional considerations.

The Perils of Ignoring the Taliban Regime’s Support for Terror Groups

Abdul Basit

According to the Global Terrorism Index 2025, Pakistan was the second-worst country affected by terrorism in the preceding year. This isn’t surprising; three of the world’s ten deadliest terrorist groups — Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) — operate in Pakistan. These groups have grown deadlier since the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan.

Despite obligations under the 2020 Doha Agreement to not allow terrorist groups to use Afghan soil for terrorism in other countries, the Taliban regime has allowed the TTP to use hideouts in Afghanistan to plot attacks in Pakistan.

The Taliban’s ideological patronage of and logistical support to the TTP has emboldened the latter and enabled it to expand its organizational framework and boost its operational strength. Ahead of the U.S. exit from Afghanistan, TTP renewed its oath of allegiance to the Taliban’s Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada in order to continue living in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan energized the TTP and provided it with a template to emulate for its militant campaign in Pakistan.

Terrorism Assessment For Afghanistan – Analysis

Luke Coffey

According to the US government’s annual threat assessment, released by its intelligence community this week, Daesh remains the most significant terrorism challenge facing America and its partners.

The assessment is part of a broader report that addresses all threats to the US including, but not limited to, terrorism. Notably, this year’s report includes an alarming section about the role of Daesh in Afghanistan.

It states that Daesh’s Afghan branch, the so-called ISIS-K, “remains the most capable of carrying out external terrorist attacks and maintains the intent to conduct attacks in South and Central Asia, and globally, although its capabilities vary.” The report also warns that the group is “expanding capability beyond South Asia and ability to inspire individuals to conduct attacks abroad.”

The US is not alone in this assessment. A recent report by the UN Security Council similarly highlighted the growing threat from Daesh in Afghanistan. It stated that the group maintains a presence throughout South and Central Asia, even though its operational hub remains in Afghanistan.

Taiwan is under a triple security threat

Shanna Khayat

Taiwan’s national security is increasingly jeopardized—externally, from two different directions, and also from within.

The largest and most direct threat, of course, is the People’s Republic of China. Beijing’s long-standing position is that Taiwan must not formally politically separate itself from China. The red line for military action by the PRC has never been crystal clear. Taiwan presidents from Chen Shiu-bian (2000—2008) to current president Lai Ching-te have publicly said “Taiwan is an independent, sovereign country.” Until recently it was reasonable to believe Beijing might be content to kick the can down the road indefinitely as long as the governments in Taipei did not attempt a gesture that would seem to codify juridical separation from China, such as altering the Republic of China constitution.

That has become doubtful, however, under paramount leader Xi Jinping. Xi has expressed impatience with the lack of progress toward unification, saying Taiwan’s de facto independence “should not be passed down generation after generation.” Beijing implicitly announced in early 2024 the Chinese military would hold a large military exercise later in the year after President Lai’s inauguration speech expected in May. The comments in Lai’s speech about China were rather mild, but the People’s Liberation Army went ahead with its war games anyway. The situation is much more dangerous if cautious behavior by Taipei no longer restrains potential aggression by China.

PRC Malign influence at Home and Abroad—Peter Mattis's Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Peter Mattis

I. OVERVIEW

Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you.

Countering the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) efforts to build political influence, recruit and mobilize civil society outside the borders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and shape the world in coercive, corrupting, and covert ways is fundamental to U.S. success in this rivalry. Any sustainable, long-term strategy for addressing China’s challenge requires the integrity of U.S. political and policymaking processes—and those of our allies and partners. This requires grappling with the challenges posed by the Party’s efforts to shape the United States and others by interfering in our politics and domestic affairs.

The United States, its political and business elite, its thinkers, and its Chinese communities have long been targets for the CCP. The Party employs tools that go well beyond traditional public diplomacy efforts. Often these tools lead to activities that are, in the words of former Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, corrupt, covert, and/or coercive. Nevertheless, many activities are not covered by Turnbull’s three “Cs” but are still concerning and undermine the ability of the United States, its allies, and its partners to comprehend and address Beijing’s challenge.

Obscurity by Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

Tanner Greer

Introduction

Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy.

That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be.

Autonomous Battlefield: PLA Lessons from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Sunny Cheung & Joe McReynolds

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has vividly demonstrated the pivotal role autonomous and drone-based systems play in modern warfare. Chinese military experts have gained invaluable insights as the conflict has evolved over the last three years, reshaping their understanding of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of autonomous systems that likely will play an important role in a potential conflict over Taiwan.

In late March, state media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reported the rapid evolution of anti-drone technologies, with aerospace expert Wang Ya’nan (王亚男) emphasizing the urgent need for more cost-effective and efficient countermeasures (CNR, March 23). Traditional methods, he noted, are prohibitively expensive—often hundreds of times the cost of the drones that they are meant to defeat—and still fall short in detection accuracy and coverage. Meanwhile, reports have surfaced of some PRC factories openly displaying Ukrainian flags, signaling acknowledgement for and partnerships with Ukraine’s drone manufacturers instead of Russia’s (X/@wartranslated, March 16). This speaks to the complex ways in which policymakers and key observers within the PRC perceive and are interpreting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Turkey’s cautionary tale: The fall of the courts is the fall of freedom

Dan Perry

When Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu — widely seen as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s most formidable political rival — was arrested at his home on flimsy corruption charges, Turkey entered a new and dangerous phase in its long democratic unravelling. His detention, followed by mass protests, violent crackdowns, and the arrest of demonstrators and journalists, is the natural outcome of years of democratic backsliding — which began with the dismantling of judicial independence.

Turkey’s descent is not just Turkey’s problem, and it’s not just inconvenient because Turkey is large and important, but is a fundamental warning about political systems. The architecture of liberal democracy — checks and balances, independent courts, protected rights — doesn’t dismantle itself overnight. It is chipped away, often in full view of the public, under the pretense of “majority rule.” It happens gradually, even legally, until suddenly a country that holds elections no longer holds power to account.

The signs of democratic backsliding, always with the freedom of the courts politicized or threatened, are visible in many countries once thought immune — most prominently at present in Israel, Hungary … and the United States.

A Grim Message for Iranians - Opinion

Ilan Berman

On March 20, Iranians in Iran and in the diaspora commemorated Nowruz, the Persian New Year. Typically, U.S. administrations have used the occasion to practice some soft power diplomacy. In the past, America's Nowruz greetings have taken pains to highlight Iran's proud pre-Islamic heritage, underscore its immense civilizational potential, and draw a distinction between the country's historic greatness and its current repressive clerical regime.

Not this year, however. The congratulatory message from the new Trump White House on March 19 was decidedly pro forma. At a paltry 109 words, the missive didn't include any of the strategic messaging employed by previous administrations, contenting itself with wishes for a "joyous holiday."

That minimalist approach is an alarming signal of what might be to come, as the Trump administration pivots toward engagement with Iran's ayatollahs.

Signs of such a shift are everywhere. True, President Donald Trump has now reinstated his first term policy of "maximum pressure" against the Islamic Republic. But he has also coupled it with an offer of renewed negotiations with Iran's clerical regime. And while that outreach in principle comes with an expiration date, the goalposts of America's approach to Iran appear to be shifting significantly.

The Limits of Trump’s Hardball Diplomacy

Matias Spektor

No great power sustained as dominant a position over its neighboring region as the United States did during most of the twentieth century. But in recent decades, Washington has largely disregarded its neighbors. Since a free trade agreement with Canada and Mexico and a military initiative to help Colombia combat drug cartels were negotiated more than 25 years ago, United States policy in the Americas has consisted mostly of failed measures to stem flows of migrants and drugs across U.S. borders. This neglect has opened the door for China and Russia to exert increasing influence across the Western Hemisphere.

Since the beginning of his political career, U.S. President Donald Trump has signaled his intention to reassert U.S. dominance in the region. He hopes to resist China and Russia’s growing diplomatic, economic, and military engagement with countries that have traditionally been within the United States’ sphere of influence, and doing so while delivering on issues important to his base, including securing favorable trade terms and stopping flows of both migrants and fentanyl. During Trump’s first administration, these goals were largely aspirational. He and his officials frequently invoked the Monroe Doctrine, the 1823 declaration asserting exclusive U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere, when they opposed Russian military cooperation with Latin American countries, say, or framed Chinese economic expansion in the region as a security threat. Rex Tillerson, Trump’s first secretary of state, called the doctrine “as relevant today as when it was written.” Ultimately, these appeals amounted mostly to rhetorical posturing and, because of policy inconsistencies and incompetence, effected little concrete change. In his second term, however, Trump is accompanying radical rhetoric about regional hegemony with real action.

Trump is redefining, not abandoning, American soft power - Opinion

Kurt Davis Jr

For decades, the United States projected global influence through what foreign policy experts call “soft power” – the ability to shape world affairs through cultural appeal, diplomatic engagement and ideological attraction rather than military force.

Under President Donald Trump’s administration, this traditional approach to international relations is undergoing a fundamental transformation.

Critics decry the shift as abandonment of American leadership. They’re missing the point. What we’re witnessing isn’t a reckless dismantling of American influence but rather a necessary recalibration for a world where the old rules no longer apply.

The traditional soft power model lacked clear metrics in today’s competitive global landscape. While previous administrations invested heavily in abstract notions of goodwill and long-term influence, Trump recognized that in a world where China and Russia wield economic leverage to expand their spheres of influence, America needed a strategy prioritizing tangible returns over ideological appeal.

This approach has manifested in several high-profile decisions: withdrawing from agreements like the Paris Climate Accord and the Iran nuclear deal, questioning the value proposition of NATO (in today’s form), and reconsidering America’s role in international organizations.

If negotiations among Russia, Ukraine, US collapse, what’s next?

Stephen Bryen

It may be that the US-Russia and US-Ukraine negotiations are going off the rails.

Meanwhile the US is anxious for Europe to take over responsibility for supporting Ukraine as Washington turns to the Middle East and Pacific regions. The Europeans then will need to decide if they are ready, willing and able to make up the difference.

One strategy for them is to try to secure western Ukraine, figuring the Russians will be successful east of the Dnieper, But that idea is not a cake walk and could trigger a wider conflict. Washington will have to make up its mind on what is next regarding Ukraine.

President Trump is complaining that the Russians are dragging out negotiations on a comprehensive ceasefire, and he is threatening Russia with new energy sanctions. The main feature of the threat from Trump is that countries that buy Russian oil will be cut off from trade with the US. This includes India and China.

US total goods trade with China was an estimated $582.4 billion in 2024. US goods exports to China in 2024 were $143.5 billion.

In 2023-24, the US was the largest trading partner of India with $119.71 billion bilateral trade in goods ($77.51 billion worth of exports, $42.19 billion of imports, with $35.31 billion trade surplus).

Putin’s Warpath Goes Through Arctic

Pavel K. Baev

Russia’s war against Ukraine is stuck in a rigid deadlock. The prospect of agreeing on a ceasefire, which had appeared within reach a couple of weeks ago, has, however, become distant and blurred. Russian President Vladimir Putin is not procrastinating or bargaining, he deliberately persists with unfeasible conditions while accepting concessions as a matter of routine (Re: Russia, March 27). This uncompromising position led to little progress gained from the tri-lateral U.S.-Russia-Ukraine talks in Saudi Arabia on reducing hostilities in the Black Sea (Carnegie Politika, March 27). An agreement should have been possible because Ukraine consistently refrains from attacking tankers of the Russian “shadow fleet” with its naval drones, but Moscow demands more concessions while refusing to cease missile strikes on Odesa (see EDM; Novaya gazeta Europe, March 28). At the end of the week, Putin expeditiously shifted the focus of political maneuvering from the Black Sea to the Arctic.

The annual forum “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue” in Murmansk, held on March 27, used to be a meeting place for international stakeholders, but it has been reduced to a podium for Putin’s rhetoric (see Panorama, March 21; Izvestiya, March 28). Russia is excluded from all formats of international cooperation, and its partnership with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) yields few benefits. Consequently, Putin made a rare admission that the model for developing the Northern Sea Route was unworkable (Kommersant, March 27). He did not mention that the production of natural gas was fast contracting and Gazprom’s market value was sinking (Lenta.ru; RBC, March 28). In Putin’s mind, these economic setbacks are of scant significance compared to the main source of Russia’s strength in the Arctic—the Northern Fleet.

Just When Things Couldn’t Possibly Get Worse in Myanmar, They Do

Joshua Kurlantzick

Even before the massive earthquake that struck Myanmar and parts of Thailand today, Myanmar was already one of the most troubled and impoverished countries in the world. Following a coup in 2021, the junta has been fighting a bloody war against opposition groups. The junta has lost a lot of ground (though the opposition may be hurt by the U.S. withdrawal of non-lethal aid under the Trump administration) and faced massive defections, low morale, and a declining ability to fight ground battles in rugged terrain.

As a result, the junta has turned to dropping bombs indiscriminately on villages, a war crime. It also has become increasingly dependent on support from North Korea and sometimes Russia, though Russia has its own battles to worry about.

As Human Rights Watch notes in its most recent cataloging of atrocities in Myanmar: “The junta has driven the country further into a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe. At least 55 townships are under martial law. Faced with opposition from the general population and pro-democracy armed groups, the military has struggled to maintain control over the country. The junta’s widespread and systematic abuses against the population—including arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial killings, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians—amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes … At least 24,000 anti-coup protesters have been arrested since the coup, and 4,000 killed, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. The Peace Research Institute of Oslo estimates actual figures are much higher … [The] military [has] used a thermobaric bomb during an attack on an opposition building in the village of Pa Zi Gyi in Sagaing Region, killing more than 160 people, including many children. This enhanced-blast type munition caused indiscriminate and disproportionate civilian casualties in violation of international humanitarian law and was an apparent war crime.” This was but one of many indiscriminate air attacks by the junta.

Biden opened the door to missile proliferation. Trump should close it

Debak Das

In its final weeks in the White House, the Biden administration announced that it had updated the policy guidance for the implementation by the United States of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a multilateral export control effort that seeks to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology. Per the new guidance, the United States will now allow and facilitate support for transferring the regime’s category I items—including long-range ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and unmanned aerial systems. According to President Biden’s National Security Memorandum on the MTCR, the policy change will enable the United States to transfer entire long-range cruise missiles and ballistic missile systems and their technology to its partners and allies who seek to build their own defense and missile capabilities.

A factsheet released by the White House on January 7 asserts that the new guidance will “advance nonproliferation goals and bolster allied defense capabilities.” But it will have the opposite effect.

Diluting the restrictions on the transfer of long-range nuclear-capable missile systems and space launch vehicles that can be modified to deliver nuclear weapons will weaken the non-proliferation regime and contribute to global missile proliferation. The nuclear non-proliferation order is already facing severe challenges, with several new countries threatening to develop nuclear weapons, missile arsenals proliferating in the Indo-Pacific region, and growing concerns about a new wave of nuclear proliferation being driven by the Trump administration’s abandonment of allies. The new missile transfer guidance will also set a precedent by which Russia and China might assume greater flexibility to dodge their MTCR commitments and spread ballistic missile technology.

The Rise of the Gurus

Sam Freedman

Until recently, the prime minister was the most important person in British politics. But when the New Statesman published its annual list of the most powerful people on the left in June last year, with Keir Starmer poised to take office, the number-one spot went not to Starmer, but to his adviser Morgan McSweeney.

This is a ranking corroborated by Get In, an impeccably sourced and enjoyably written history of Labour’s rise to power by two of Westminster’s sharpest young journalists, Patrick Maguire and Gabriel Pogrund. Their protagonist is unquestionably the shadowy Irishman, rather than his nominal boss. Starmer may have ultimate authority, but, the authors argue, he has largely outsourced his political thinking.

The prime minister is presented – accurately, by all accounts – as a man with no fixed ideology and a bureaucrat’s fixation on “what works”, as if that can be identified without any particular vision of what he wants the country to look like. Starmer does care a lot about winning, however, which explains his willingness to adopt whatever positions McSweeney thinks is necessary at any given time, to the point that another adviser is quoted as saying, “Keir’s not driving the train. He thinks he’s driving the train, but we’ve sat him at the front of the DLR [the automated Docklands Light Railway]”.

Holland Struggles to Stem the Flow of Cocaine into Europe - Opinion

Jonathan Alpeyrie

Cocaine seizures in Holland were up around 17% in 2023, before dropping by 40% in 2024. What are some of the forces at work behind the ebb and flow of cocaine trafficking? What has changed in recent years?

In 2020, Western and Central Europe comprised of about 21% of the overall global demand for cocaine. Cocaine is now the second most consumed illicit drug on the old continent, right behind cannabis. This astounding comeback of the white powder is partially explained due to changing tastes among drug consumers, but also a weak European response to combating what has become a strategic issue. Europe has become an attractive destination for drug traffickers seeking further profits and lower risks. This is due to a higher market price and shorter prison sentences for possession and consumption than in the United States.

The market price differences can be quite stark. While cocaine costs approximately $28,000 a kilo in the U.S., the price per kilo in Europe exceeds $40,000 in places like Spain and France, and as much as $219,000 in Estonia.

Fighting for our Future: How—and Why—We Brought Wargames to an ROTC Program

William Kuebler, Steven Lohr and James Sterrett

Why does the US military use wargames?

As Sanu Kainikara notes, “war games designed for generic training are extremely useful in promoting a deeper understanding of the profession of arms and the art of warfare within the officer cadre.” And arguably, wargames are even more relevant given the current global strategic landscape and US military priorities: incorporating them as part of combat leader training is an invaluable tool for accomplishing the secretary of defense’s goal of improving “lethality, readiness, and warfighting” in the Department of Defense.

European militaries have used wargaming for over two hundred years to train personnel in decision-making and to test plans. However, they have a unique utility when used to prepare junior leaders, as a tool for training military personnel in tactics and operational art, as former Marine Corps Commandant General David H. Berger has noted.

Wargaming can provide inexperienced personnel with a potentially lifesaving understanding of doctrine and both friendly and enemy tactics, techniques and procedures. A DARPA study found that inexperienced troops suffered forty percent of combat losses in their first three months of a deployment. Two factors cited by the study for the increased casualty rates were lack of familiarity with the enemy tactics and general lack of experience. These factors can be mitigated through wargaming.

Israel’s Heven Drones says its hydrogen-fueled flying robots are a military game-changer

Sharon Wrobel

Israeli-American startup founder Bentzion Levinson is one of many entrepreneurs who returned from the battlefield with a sense of urgency after being on extended reserve duty during Israel’s 17-month military campaign against the Hamas terror group in the Gaza Strip. For Levinson, the war exposed the IDF’s vast challenge to defend against cheap and effective enemy drones that were causing casualties and damage.

“On October 7, 2023, Hamas used cheap Chinese drones bought on Alibaba to disable our cameras and monitoring systems,” Levinson, a reserve combat commander, told The Times of Israel. “Serving on the northern border for more than two months, I experienced how the [Iran-backed] Hezbollah group was taking down soldiers with drones.”

“I came back to work at the drone startup I founded a couple of years ago with the urgency and need to take action and provide the best tech for the most complex missions, as drones are reshaping modern global warfare and can get Israeli soldiers out of harm’s way,” Levinson said.

Born in New York, Levinson moved to Israel with his family at the age of 10, went through the Israeli education system and served as a combat commander in the IDF. In 2018, he joined a national hackathon project tasked with helping quash the scourge of balloons, kites and drones that Hamas launched from the Gaza Strip carrying airborne incendiary devices that started countless fires and burned large swaths of Israeli land.

Diplomacy Is the Newest Front in the Russia-Ukraine War

RICHARD HAASS

The war between Russia and Ukraine continues unabated. Neither side is in a position to achieve its stated objectives through military force. But now there is significant diplomatic activity as well.

How Aristotle Can Save Us

ANTARA HALDAR

In a 1995 speech outlining his “Visions for the 21st Century,” the renowned astrophysicist Carl Sagan called attention to the fragility of human civilization, given our infinitesimally small presence within the cosmos. Our future, he warned, depends entirely on our learning to live wisely and humbly together.

Clearly, we didn’t get the message. Three decades on, our “pale blue dot” is riven by geopolitical turmoil, and the late-twentieth-century hope for an ascendent global liberalism has faded. Faced with such radical uncertainty, the best strategy may be to return to basics. And to explore the most profound of all questions – what is the good life? – there is no better guide than Aristotle, whose Politics and Nicomachean Ethics offer a framework that is strikingly relevant for this age of moral confusion and civic fragmentation.

Unlike the modern liberal tradition, which exalts individual autonomy, Aristotle began from a different premise: human beings are not self-contained units, but social animals whose flourishing depends on the cultivation of virtues within a political community. To live well is not simply to do what one wants; rather, it requires the cultivation of character through lifelong education and habituation, and engagement in a shared civic life. (Not incidentally, the contemporary appeal of many nationalists and populists is that they offer a vision of the good life.)

Trump’s Latin America agenda: the risks of short-termism

Irene Mia

Just a couple months into President Donald Trump’s second term, United States–Latin America relations have hit a new low. While past administrations largely overlooked the region, Trump’s ‘America First’ vision has gone beyond neglect to a position of overt hostility. His administration views Latin America primarily as a security threat, associating it with drug trafficking, organised crime and incoming migration, while also perceiving its ties with US geopolitical rivals, particularly China, as uncomfortably close. Based on this reading, the US approach has become essentially negative, prioritising unilateral action and dominance rather than partnership. In a revival of the nineteenth-century Monroe Doctrine, the region is being treated less as an equal partner and more as a sphere of influence to be controlled in line with US strategic interests.

Trump has wasted no time in pushing forward his negative Latin America agenda. The region has been unusually prominent as a target of some of the array of domestic and foreign-policy measures already introduced by the new administration. These measures have included imposing a 25% tariff on goods (with some exceptions) from Mexico in retaliation for its perceived failure to curb the flow of fentanyl and migrants across the border; designating eight Latin American transnational criminal groups as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs); threatening to take back control of the Panama Canal as a matter of national security; and initiating large-scale, often unlawful deportations of Latin American migrants, either to their home countries or to ‘safe’ third countries in the region. Trump’s muscular approach appears to be yielding some early success. However, its short-term focus and one-dimensional nature could undermine its stated goals in the long run.

A European Reassurance Force for Ukraine: Options and Challenges

Ben Barry, Jonty Kennon, Douglas Barrie, Nick Childs, James Hackett, Henry Boyd, Jonathan Bentham, Dzaky Naradichiantama & Michael Tong

The UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron recently announced their willingness to create a ‘coalition of the willing’ to safeguard a potential ceasefire agreement in Ukraine. A ‘reassurance’ or ‘deterrence’ force is a better frame for this discussion than a ‘peacekeeping force’, given that one of its tasks would be to respond to a potential Russian violation of a ceasefire agreement. Therefore, agreed response options in the event of a significant breach of a ceasefire would bolster the deterrent value of any deployment. Consequently, the force deployed would need to be credible to Moscow and the coalition resolved to act decisively in the event of a breach of the ceasefire.

The composition of such a force remains unclear, though both leaders have said a US ‘backstop’ is needed. This IISS analysis sets out three options for such a reassurance force and challenges that may be posed to their deployment:
  • A small-scale force with a deployed land component of a brigade of about 10,000 troops, supported by a limited air component and naval assets;
  • A medium-scale force based on a land component of a large division, with about 25,000 troops supported by larger air and maritime components; and
  • A large-scale force centred on a corps-sized land component of between 60,000 and 100,000 troops, supported by substantial air and maritime elements.

Trump knows what he’s doing, tariffs are a honeytrap to lure industries to the States

Ralph Schoellhammer

Is there any rhyme or reason to what seems like the latest episode of “Tariffs Gone Wild”? This question hovers over European policymakers as the United States, under its bombastic showman-in-chief, slaps tariffs on nations left, right, and centre—with allies sometimes catching it worse than adversaries. I’ve got my theories, and while crystal balls are hard to come by, indulge me as I unravel what might be the method behind the madness. And, oh Europe—especially you, Germany—take notes.

Donald Trump, that mercurial maestro of the deal, might seem like he’s winging it as usual, but brushing off his trade manoeuvres as mere presidential quirkiness would be a rookie mistake. The current US administration is hurtling forward like a bull in a china shop, but what they might be doing is classic Schumpeterian “creative destruction”, dear readers. Imagine, if you will, a world where horse-drawn carriages still monopolize the roads, and Walkmans are the apex of audio-tech—yes, that’s what happens without innovation that charitably obliterates the old.

Indeed, Uncle Sam appears to be applying this fresh paint of creative destruction, not just to the economy but to the very framework of governance. The sneered-at “Department of Government Efficiency” is scattering the legacies of outdated bureaucrats to the winds, perhaps thinking new nimble bureaucracies will somehow rise phoenix-like from the ashes.

Army eyes artificial intelligence to enhance future Golden Dome

Jen Judson

The U.S. Army is looking to increase autonomy through artificial intelligence solutions to reduce the manpower needed to manage Golden Dome, President Donald Trump’s desired homeland missile defense architecture, the service’s program executive officer for missiles and space said this week.

As the Army contributes a large portion of the in-development air and missile defense architecture for Guam, it is looking to adapt those capabilities for a Golden Dome application, Maj. Gen. Frank Lozano told Defense News in an interview at Redstone Arsenal on Wednesday amid the Association of the U.S. Army’s Global Force Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama.

Some of the Army’s major contributions to the Guam Defense System include new modernized radars, an emerging Indirect Fire Protection Capability and its new Integrated Battle Command System, or IBCS.

“What we’re trying to do is three things,” Lozano said. “We’re wanting to integrate more AI-enabled fire control so that will help us reduce the manpower footprint. We’re wanting to create more remotely operated systems so that we don’t have to have so many operators and maintainers associated with every single piece of equipment that’s out there.”

2 April 2025

What to expect from Modi-Putin tete-e-tete

Andrew Korybko

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed that preparations are underway for Putin’s reciprocal trip to Delhi after Modi visited Moscow last summer as the first foreign trip of his third term.

Readers can review the outcome of their most recent summit here, while the present piece will forecast what they might discuss during their next one, the date of which has yet to be determined.

Given their shared enduring interests as well as the latest international developments, they’re expected to discuss:

1. Arms

Russian-Indian Defense Ties Are Evolving With The Times”, having moved beyond their prior transactional relationship to the sharing of Russian technologies to help develop India’s domestic military-industrial complex.

The generalities of this will likely be discussed in the context of their newly updated military pact, as will the specifics as they relate to India’s planned procurement of jointly produced 800-kilometer-range BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and its interest in Russia’s Su-57 jets.


A different kind of heart: Tibetans’ genetic uniqueness and enduring cultural sway

Razib Khan

Fourteen years ago, a UC Berkeley team studying altitude adaptation in Tibetans developed a method to scan the genome of various modern populations, looking for outlier gene frequencies compared to related populations. First, they compared Tibetans, Han Chinese and Northern Europeans, looking for genomic regions where Tibetans were the exception, the outlier. This approach identified EPAS1, a gene implicated in high-altitude adaptation, as a likely target of positive selection in Tibetans years before it was discovered that this gene introgressed from Denisovans.

This sort of technique obviously requires a good grasp of the genome’s broader phylogenetic patterns. You need some sense of the history of the populations to infer the peregrinations of specific genes. Next, calculating the timescale of divergences between Tibetans and Han Chinese, the authors estimated the two populations split 2,750 years ago. The problem with this estimate is that it places the proto-Tibetan stream’s separation from the proto-Han one at 750 BC, at least a millennium after we know the Han already existed as a people, and centuries into their long written history. Of course, this estimate, as estimates generally do, has multiple simplifying assumptions baked in that might be incorrect. For example, Han Chinese and Tibetans were both modeled as homogeneous groups at the tips of a bifurcating tree, rather than mixed populations. If Tibetans were a mix of two populations, each with distinct historic relatedness to the Han Chinese, then the average divergence estimate may have been misleading.

Pakistan Welcomes Starlink. But Can It Deliver on Its Promise?

Zohaib Alta and Nimrah Javed

On March 21, 2025, Pakistan granted a temporary No Objection Certificate (NOC) to Starlink, the satellite internet service developed by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, allowing it to begin operations in the country. The decision, issued after consensus among regulatory and security bodies, marks a milestone in Pakistan’s ongoing effort to modernize its digital infrastructure and deliver internet access to underserved regions. Starlink’s approval sets the stage for a potential leap forward in connectivity, particularly for rural, remote, and conflict-prone areas that remain beyond the reach of fiber optics and reliable mobile data coverage.

In Pakistan, the digital divide is not merely a technological issue; it is an economic and social barrier. While the country has over 142 million broadband subscriptions, nearly 99 percent are mobile-based, and fixed broadband penetration remains under 1 percent. Still, the economic potential is hard to ignore. Pakistan’s digital economy is steadily expanding – IT exports hit $3.2 billion in fiscal year 2024 – and more than 1.5 million freelancers are already contributing to global platforms from across the country. But most of that growth is happening in big cities.

Fergana Valley: Stability, Development, and Strategic Interests


Executive Summary

The Fergana Valley, a strategically significant region in Central Asia, has long been a focal point of geopolitical tensions and economic development challenges. Spanning Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, unresolved border disputes, ethnic tensions, terrorism, and economic fragility have shaped the valley.

Recent agreements on border demarcation between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan provide an opportunity for enhanced regional stability, economic integration, and industrial growth. The possible success of infrastructural projects such as CASA-1000 and the expansion of industrial clusters will play a critical role in determining the valley’s future.

External actors, including China, Russia, and the United States, also have vested interests in the valley’s stability, given its strategic importance in trade and security. Addressing existing challenges will require strong regional cooperation, transparent governance, and sustained economic investment.

Beijing will not attack Taiwan if it thinks trade will suffer, US senators hear

Bochen Han

Beijing would not invade Taiwan if it believed that US allies and partners would respond by severing trade ties, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard on Wednesday, as expert witnesses urged lawmakers to acknowledge that allies’ strategic contributions go beyond defence spending.

Noting that China is “an export-driven economy”, Oriana Skylar Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, said that “if they believed trade with US allies and partners would stop if they attacked Taiwan, they would never do it”.

Beijing regards Taiwan as a renegade province, to be eventually united with the mainland, by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island militarily.

Mastro and other witnesses at the committee hearing stressed that US allies and partners could provide Washington much more than just financial aid to help deter China militarily.

The Party’s One-Way Approach to People-to-People Exchanges

Cheryl Yu

In a recent interview with the People’s Daily, the flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Mayor of Steilacoom in Washington State, Dick Muri, said students from the town benefited from the “inviting 50,000 American youth to China for exchange and study over the next five years” initiative (‘未来5年邀请5万名美国青少年来华交流学习’倡议). He said that the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) should maintain cooperation and friendly relations because “we can have candid exchanges and discussions and learn from each other, and this will make us better and better” (我们可以进行坦诚的交流与讨论,相互学习,这会让我们变得越来越好) (People’s Daily, January 11). His comments reflect the PRC’s effective use of people-to-people exchanges to advance its agenda.

The PRC uses people-to-people exchanges to influence American perceptions to its benefit. The CCP manages all such exchanges via the united front system in ways that intentionally create asymmetries of understanding between the two countries. This does little to promote the interests of the United States or the Chinese people, but allows the Party to control how it is perceived overseas and, ultimately, to enhance its power globally.

Germany decides to leave history in the past and prepare for war

Sarah Rainsford

A missile launcher sends a cloud of brown dust into the air as it hurtles across a field towards the firing line. Moments later comes a soldier's countdown, from five to 'Fire!', before a rocket roars into the sky.

The blasts and booms from such military training exercises are so constant that locals in the nearby small town of Munster barely notice anymore.

But life here is set to get even louder.

Germany's military, the Bundeswehr, recently got the all-clear for a massive increase in investment after parliament voted to exempt defence spending from strict rules on debt.

The country's top general has told the BBC the cash boost is urgently needed because he believes Russian aggression won't stop at Ukraine.

"We are threatened by Russia. We are threatened by Putin. We have to do whatever is needed to deter that," Gen Carsten Breuer says. He warns that Nato should be braced for a possible attack in as little as four years.

"It's not about how much time I need, it's much more about how much time Putin gives us to be prepared," the defence chief says bluntly. "And the sooner we are prepared the better."

Europe’s Nuclear Trilemma

Mark S. Bell and Fabian R. Hoffmann

Over the first months of Donald Trump’s presidency, it has become increasingly clear to European leaders that remaining reliant on the United States to underwrite the continent’s security would be a dangerous gamble. Trump’s overtures to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Vice President JD Vance’s public attacks on the domestic policies of European countries, the administration’s imposition of tariffs, and threats to the Danish territory of Greenland have pushed European leaders to begin to think seriously about a future in which the United States—and its nuclear weapons—are no longer the ultimate guarantor of European security.

Skepticism about the United States’ willingness to fight a nuclear war on Europe’s behalf long predates Trump. During the Cold War, French President Charles de Gaulle famously questioned whether the United States would “trade New York for Paris.” But the Trump administration’s hostility has given new urgency to Europe’s efforts to provide for its own defense.

Nonetheless, for Europe to assume responsibility for its own security is not simply a matter of generating more political will, higher defense budgets, or better coordinated procurement processes. Europe must navigate a strategic trilemma regarding its nuclear options. European leaders have three goals they would like to achieve: credible and effective deterrence against Russia; strategic stability, understood as lower incentives for any state to be the first to use a nuclear weapon; and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to new states. Unfortunately, Europe cannot achieve them all. In fact, choosing any two makes the third impossible. If Europe chooses strategic stability and nonproliferation, it may not be able to deter Russia. But to fortify its nuclear posture enough for credible deterrence, Europe must either allow new states to acquire the weapons or sacrifice a degree of strategic stability. None of the available choices are ideal. But in the absence of protection from across the Atlantic, Europe would be best served by choosing nonproliferation and credible deterrence. Accepting a level of strategic instability in European-Russian relations requires assuming genuine nuclear risks. The alternatives, however, would be even more dangerous.

A Third Way To End The War In Ukraine – OpEd

M.K. Bhadrakumar

In an unguarded moment, perhaps, ex-UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson blurted out recently in an interview that the ultranationalist elements who rule the roost in Kiev are a formidable obstacle to ending the war in Ukraine. For Johnson, this might be a blame game to absolve himself of responsibility, given his own dubious role as then PM (in cahoots with President Joe Biden) in undermining the Istanbul agreement in April 2022 to rev up the simmering conflict and turn it to a full-fledged US-led proxy war against Russia.

What Johnson will not admit, though, is that the ascendance of the MI6, Britain’s intelligence agency, in the power structure in Kiev goes back by several years. MI6 was responsible for the personal security of President Zelensky. MI6 took advantage by positioning itself to choreograph the future trajectory of the war and subsequently in the planning and execution of major covert operations directed against the Russian forces — and ultimately to carry the war into Russian soil itself.

According to reports, the UK intends to establish a base in the Odessa region on the Black Sea coastline. See my article The Hundred Years War Donald Trump should know about, Deccan Herald, January 29, 2025.

Soft power from the rooftop of the world

Razib Khan

In 1915, nine lamas arrived in St. Petersburg, Russia, to inaugurate the Datsan Gunzechoinei Buddhist temple there. Russia’s last Tsar, Nicholas II, had approved its construction in the empire’s then capital. Erecting a temple on Europe’s northeastern fringe as the 20th century dawned may sound odd, but Buddhism had actually been one of the Russian Empire’s official religions since 1741. Hundreds of thousands of the Tsar’s subjects were devotees of the Vajrayana tradition; from Kalmyk Mongols tending their herds on the Volga to Tuvan Turks ascending Siberian peaks every summer to reach upland pastures.

Vajrayana derives from the Sanskrit vajra, a diamond-strong thunderbolt the storm god Indra yields, thus its alternate labels: the “Diamond Vehicle” or “Thunderbolt Vehicle.” Vajrayana is Buddhism’s third and youngest tradition, after Theravada or the “Way of Elders,” which is both the most ancient and traditional variant dominant in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, and the Mahayana tradition of China and Japan, which translates as the “Great Vehicle.” Theravada puts the onus on individual action to attain salvation, while Mahayana sects count on the power of supernatural intercessory beings, or bodhisattvas, to aid believers in attaining enlightenment. Vajrayana, meanwhile, though originally an extension of the Mahayana tradition, contends that enlightenment can be accelerated into a single lifetime through initiatory rites supervised by a teacher of confirmed spiritual lineage, often himself a reincarnated bodhisattva in the flesh (rather than an unseen spirit). These teachers are called lamas, the Tibetan word for guru, and Vajrayana is often termed “Lamaist” for their essential role. Turkic and Mongolian Vajrayana adherents also use the term lama for their religious leaders, illustrating Tibetans’ influence after incubating and nourishing this form of Buddhism for over a millennium.